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“I Know My Client Would Never Hurt
His Daughter, But How Can I Prove
It?”
A LAWYER’S GUIDE TO DEFENDING AGAINST
CHILD SEXUAL ASSAULT ACCOMMODATION
SYNDROME EVIDENCE
Mr. Smith1 settles into work on a Monday morning,
completely content after sharing a wonderful weekend with his
daughter Jane.2 Although his divorce might be frustrating, he
could not be happier that he has custody of his eight-year-old
daughter on the weekend. Just then, his phone rings; his
divorce attorney is on the line. Apparently, his soon-to-be ex-
wife has called child protective services and has accused him of
sexually abusing his daughter during their last weekend visit.
Shocked, he does not respond. The attorney continues, saying,
“Your daughter told a caseworker, ‘[Daddy] hurt my private
place with his private place.’”3 Defeated, Mr. Smith hangs up
the phone and his mind begins to race with all sorts of
1 This note will refer to the accuser as female and the accused as male, as
these gender choices represent the more common way these issues arise—when a
mother accuses her soon-to-be-ex-husband of sexually abusing their child. See RICHARD
A. GARDNER, M.D., TRUE AND FALSE ACCUSATIONS OF CHILD SEX ABUSE 183 (1992)
(“Because mothers, much more commonly than fathers, are likely to initiate such
accusations, I will refer to the accuser as the mother.”). Please note that the issues
presented in this note could apply in situations involving both heterosexual and
homosexual couples, and the parents could be of either gender. Allegations of sexual
abuse of a child in custody and visitation cases can also be made against step-parents
and other cohabitants of the biological parents.
2 This note will refer to the child victim as female because Dr. Summit, in
his paper, The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, refers to the child as
female. See Roland C. Summit, The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 177, 180 (1983) (internal citations omitted) (“In the current
state of the art most of the victims available for study are young females molested by
adult males entrusted with their care.”). This is not to ignore the fact that both young
girls and boys are victims of sexual abuse. Child Sexual Abuse Statistics, NAT’L CTR. OF
VICTIMS OF CRIME, http://www.victimsofcrime.org/media/reporting-on-child-sexual-
abuse/child-sexual-abuse-statistics (last visited Jan. 30, 2015) (“1 in 5 girls and 1 in 20
boys is a victim of child sexual abuse.”).
3 TERENCE W. CAMPBELL, SMOKE AND MIRRORS: THE DEVASTATING EFFECT
OF FALSE SEXUAL ABUSE CLAIMS 31 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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questions. How could he possibly defend himself? Will he ever
be able to spend time with his daughter again? Two days later
Mr. Smith receives another phone call from his attorney—Jane
has recanted her allegations, but her mother intends to use the
allegations as a basis for sole custody. Now what?
INTRODUCTION
Allegations of child sexual abuse4 are often made by one
parent against another during divorce proceedings, especially
during custody disputes.5 In fact, these allegations are
“widespread”6 and parents make these allegations in about 2%
of cases.7 Although there is much debate over the veracity of
sexual abuse allegations made during custody disputes, studies
show that allegations made during divorce disputes are often
unfounded.8 Most of these allegations are “reported following a
4 There is no one definition of child sexual abuse. “Definitions vary
considerably and legal definitions found in state laws vary from state to
state . . . However, most experts agree on certain elements of the definition:
exploitation of the child; use of coercion, gentle though it may be; and some level of
gratification gained by the adult.” KAREN KINNEAR, CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE: A
REFERENCE HANDBOOK 2 (1995). The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act first
passed in 1974 defines “sexual abuse” as:
(A) the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement, or coercion of
any child to engage in, or assist any other person to engage in, any sexually
explicit conduct or simulation of such conduct for the purpose of producing a
visual depiction of such conduct; or (B) the rape, and in cases of caretaker or
inter-familial relationships, statutory rape, molestation, prostitution, or other
form of sexual exploitation of children, or incest with children.
42 U.S.C. § 5106g(4)(A)-(B) (2012).
5 MODERN FAMILY LAW 854 (Weisberg & Appleton eds., 4th ed. 2010).
6 GARDNER, supra note 1, at 300 (“Because a sex-abuse accusation is an
extremely powerful vengeance and exclusionary maneuver, such accusations have
become increasingly widespread in recent years.”); MELVIN G. GOLDZBAND, CUSTODY
CASES AND EXPERTWITNESSES: A MANUAL FOR ATTORNEYS 33 (2d ed. 1988) (“There is a
widespread, currently flagrant, nationwide epidemic of allegations of sexual abuse
committed against a child by one contesting parent in custody or visitation battles.”).
7 MODERN FAMILY LAW, supra note 5, at 854 (citing Kathleen Coulborn
Faller, Child Maltreatment and Endangerment in the Context of Divorce, 22 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 429, 430 (2000)); see Catherine Paquette, Note, Handling Sexual
Abuse Allegations in Child Custody Cases, 25 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1415, 1415 n.2 (1991)
(citing Thoennes & Pearson, Summary of Findings from the Sexual Abuse Allegations
Project, in SEXUAL ABUSE ALLEGATIONS IN DIVORCE CASES 135, 135 (1988)) (“In most
states, two to ten percent of all family court cases involving custody or visitation
include an allegation of sexual abuse.”).
8 See State v. Herrera, 307 P.3d 103, 117-18 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013) (“Wendy
Button, a forensic interviewer, testified for the state as an expert on the behavior and
characteristics of child sexual abuse victims. On direct examination, Button stated that
false allegations occur most commonly when the purported victims are either ‘younger
children whose parents are involved in a high-conflict divorce or custody dispute’ or
‘adolescent females.’”); see also GARDNER, supra note 1, at xxv (“There is no question
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visit with the non-custodial parent.”9 These false allegations
are often “invented by mothers to stop fathers from seeing their
children.”10 Many of these women know that an allegation of
sexual abuse is one method of “completely shutting [their]
husbands out of the child’s life.”11
Children may also be responsible for false allegations of
sexual abuse.12 They may purposefully make false allegations
to “take control over the custody determination by alleging
sexual abuse by the parent with whom the child does not want
to live.”13 Other times, children eager to please an adult
“unintentionally”14 accuse a parent of sexual abuse in response
to suggestive questioning by the other parent.15
Once an allegation is made to the family court, the
judge must consider it, which may result in the accused’s
complete loss of custody or even a loss of visitation time with
his child.16 In many of these cases that involve such allegations,
expert testimony of Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation
Syndrome (CSAAS) is introduced against the accused parent.17
CSAAS is a nondiagnostic tool used “to explain how children who
that many accusations of child sex abuse are true . . . [h]owever, there is no question,
as well, that many of the accusations are false, especially in child custody disputes
(where the vengeance element and the opportunity for exclusion of a hated spouse is
operative”.); GOLDZBAND, supra note 6, at 33 (“[M]any allegations are patently false
and based upon manipulative attempts to prevent custody by the other parent, or upon
anxiety-provoked misconceptions by battling parents.”); O’Donohue, W. et al.,
Analyzing Child Sexual Abuse Allegations, 13 FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRAC. 296, 301
(2004); Paquette, supra note 7, at 1420 (internal citation omitted) (“[F]alse
allegations . . . occur, most typically in divorce or custody cases.”); but see 10 Custody
Myths and How to Counter Them, ABA COMMISSION ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
(Quarterly E-Newsletter, Vol. 4), July 2006, available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/publishing/cdv_enewsletter/custodymythsandcounter.authcheckdam.pdf
(internal citation omitted) (“[T]he majority of allegations are substantiated . . .”).
9 Paquette, supra note 7, at 1420 (internal citation omitted).
10 Harriet Alexander, False Abuse Claims are the New Court Weapon, Retiring
Judge Says, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (July 6, 2013), http://www.smh.com.au/national/
false-abuse-claims-are-the-new-court-weapon-retiring-judge-says-20130705-2phao.html;
see Paquette, supra note 7, at 1420 (internal citations omitted) (“In some of these
instances, the parents may have created the sexual abuse occurrence in order to
terminate custody rights or prevent visitation.”); but see 10 Custody Myths and How to
Counter Them, supra note 8, at 2 (“Among false allegations, fathers are far more likely
than mothers to make intentionally false accusations . . . .” (internal citations omitted)).
11 Alexander, supra note 10.
12 Paquette, supra note 7, at 1421 (internal citation omitted).
13 Id. (internal citation omitted) (internal quotation mark omitted).
14 Id. (internal citation omitted).
15 O’Donohue, W., et al., supra note 8, at 302 (internal citation omitted).
16 Alexander, supra note 10.
17 State v. Davis, 581 N.E.2d 604, 609 (Ohio 1989) (warning that the term
“syndrome” may mislead the fact-finder: “[T]he term ‘syndrome’ is a misnomer since
symptoms or traits cannot by themselves be used as a test for sexual abuse, for the
simple reason that CSAAS is not probative of sexual abuse”).
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are abused react to their maltreatment.”18 Particularly, CSAAS
is used to explain why children may delay disclosing their abuse
and why they may recant their allegations of abuse.19 CSAAS
evidence however, has many flaws. This note seeks to enlighten
attorneys who represent parents accused of abusing their
children to the weaknesses of CSAAS evidence, and propose
meaningful steps to take when representing their clients in
custody hearings in family court.20 Part I of this note discusses
the history of CSAAS, the reasons for the syndrome, and
examines each of the elements of the syndrome. Part II explains
how, and for what purpose, CSAAS evidence is admitted into
court. Part III presents a survey of the nation’s major cases
involving CSAAS evidence. Part IV highlights the weaknesses of
CSAAS testimony and recommends sample objections attorneys
can make when arguing in favor of their motion to exclude the
expert testimony. Finally, Part V recommends sample questions
and answers attorneys for the clients accused of sexually
abusing their child can use when examining expert witnesses to
highlight the weaknesses of CSAAS testimony, even if the judge
permits the testimony into evidence.
I. CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE ACCOMMODATION SYNDROME
Based on child victim’s reports and complaints from
“sexual abuse treatment centers,”21 CSAAS was first identified
in 1983 by Dr. Roland Summit in his article, The Child Sexual
Abuse Accommodation Syndrome.22 Not only does CSAAS
18 John E. B. Myers, Special Evidentiary Issues, in CHILD WELFARE LAW AND
PRACTICE: REPRESENTING CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND STATE AGENCIES IN ABUSE,
NEGLECT, ANDDEPENDENCY CASES 305, 309 (Ventrell & Duquette eds., 2005).
19 State v. J.Q., 617 A.2d 1196, 1209 (N.J. 1993) (internal citations omitted).
20 This note relies on the term “accused” to describe the parent against whom
allegations of child sexual abuse are made. The term “defendant” is only appropriate
when the state decides to bring criminal charges (and hold a jury trial) against the
accused. If the state does not bring criminal charges against the accused, the Family
Court judge will make all determinations about the allegations. See generally Jennifer L.
Thompson, Allegations of Criminal Child Abuse in Divorce Cases, 28 A.B.A. SEC. PUB.
GPSOLO 6 (2011) (explaining the difference between criminal trials that occur after
allegations have been made in Family Court and the custody hearings taking place).
21 Susan Romer, Child Sexual Abuse in Custody and Visitation Disputes:
Problems, Progress, and Prospects, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 647, 658 (1990); see
Kenneth J. Weiss & Julia Curcio Alexander, Sex, Lies, and Statistics: Inferences from
the Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 41 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 412,
414 (2013) (“Summit’s [work was based on] statistically supported assumptions
emerging from clinical work; four years of testing in the author’s practice; strong
endorsements from victims, offenders, and family members; and consensus derived
from hundreds of training symposia.”).
22 Summit, supra note 2, at 177.
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“describe how children react (accommodate) to ongoing sexual
abuse,”23 but it also helps to identify children who may be
suffering from the effects of sexual abuse in order to provide
them with the treatment they need.24 Essentially, Dr. “Summit’s
goal was to enhance our understanding of victims, to give them
a voice, and to provide a context for understanding their coping
behavior within the family and systems of child protection and
criminal justice.”25
CSAAS is a nondiagnostic tool used solely “to explain how
children who are abused react to their maltreatment;” but CSAAS
is not used “to prove that abuse occurred.”26 To accomplish its
goal, CSAAS identifies common characteristics and their presence
in abused children.27 The presence of these common
characteristics in a child, however, is not evidence of whether a
child has been sexually abused.28 In fact, because “[t]he
accommodation syndrome is neither an illness nor a diagnosis,” it
cannot “measure whether or not a child has been sexually
abused.”29 Therefore, because CSAAS “does not detect sexual
abuse,”30 it “is not probative of sexual abuse.”31 Instead “the
syndrome assumes that abuse has occurred and helps explain the
child’s reaction to it.”32 For example, a child may tell a social
worker one day that her father sexually abused her, but may tell
her social worker the next day that her father has never touched
her inappropriately. CSAAS assumes that the child was in fact
sexually assaulted and explains why she may have recanted her
23 Myers, supra note 18, at 308 (internal citation omitted).
24 See Romer, supra note 21 (internal citation omitted) (discussing the field of
child sexual assault and the role it plays in custody and visitation disputes).
25 Weiss & Alexander, supra note 21, at 413.
26 Myers, supra note 18; see State v. Davis, 581 N.E.2d 604, 609 (Ohio 1989)
(“In effect, CSAAS does not diagnose or detect sexual abuse, but instead, assumes the
presence of such abuse and seeks to explain the child’s reaction to it.”).
27 Davis, 581 N.E.2d at 609 (internal citation omitted); Summit, supra note 3
(explaining that CSAAS evidence was intended to present “a common denominator of
the most frequently observed victim behaviors”).
28 Davis, 581 N.E.2d at 609 (internal citation omitted).
29 Myers, supra note 18 (quoting Mary B. Meinig, Profile of Roland Summit, 1
VIOLENCE UPDATE 6, 6 (1991)); Hall v. State, 611 So. 2d 915, 919 (Miss. 1992) (“[CSAAS]
was not meant to be used as a diagnostic device to show that abuse had, in fact, occurred.”).
30 Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490 (Ind. 1995) (citing John E.B. Myers et al.,
Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, 68 NEB. L. REV. 1, 67 (1989)););
Myers, supra note 18, at 318.
31 Davis, 581 N.E.2d at 609.
32 Myers, supra note 18, at 318; see Steward, 652 N.E.2d at 490 (“[T]he
syndrome was designed for purposes of treating child victims and offering them more
effective assistance within the family and within the systems of child protection and
criminal justice . . . and helps to explain reactions—such as recanting or delayed
reporting—of children assumed to have experienced abuse.”) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
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story.33 CSAAS evidence, however, does not confirm that she has
been assaulted because she has recanted her story.34 Thus, a
suggestion that a child was abused because children who have
been sexually abused often recant their stories “is an improper
usage of Dr. Summit’s theory.”35
Dr. Summit “classified the typical reactions of sexually
abused children into five categories” known as the five elements
of CSAAS: “(1) secrecy, (2) helplessness, (3) entrapment and
accommodation, (4) delayed, conflicted, and unconvincing
disclosure, and (5) retraction” or recantation.36 It is imperative for
attorneys defending those accused of sexual abuse of a child to
understand the elements of CSAAS in preparing a defense
against it. For example, questions about the child’s inconsistent
statements are generally asked by the accused’s attorney on
cross examination of the accusing parent, social worker, or the
independent child psychologist appointed by the court in a
sexual abuse case.37 The accusing parent’s attorney, however,
will most likely utilize an expert witness to testify about
CSAAS and explain why the child has made inconsistent
statements.38 Consequently, attorneys defending alleged
abusers must understand the elements of CSAAS in order to
prepare the best defense for their clients.
A. Secrecy
The first element of CSAAS, secrecy, is a “basic
childhood vulnerability” and a “precondition to the occurrence
of sexual abuse” of a child.39 “Preconditions are understood to
set the stage for the initiation and continuation of sexual
33 See Davis, 581 N.E.2d at 609; Summit, supra note 2, at 190.
34 See Davis, 581 N.E.2d at 609 (“In effect, CSAAS does not diagnose or
detect sexual abuse, but instead, assumes the presence of such abuse and seeks to
explain the child’s reaction to it.”).
35 Hall v. State, 611 So. 2d 915, 919 (Miss. 1992).
36 Elaine R. Cacciola, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony in Infrafamily
Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 34 UCLA L. REV. 175, 184 (1986).
37 See JEAN GRAM HALL & DOUGLAS F. MARTIN, CHILD ABUSE: PROCEDURE
AND EVIDENCE 186 (1993) (“Under cross-examination, a witness may be asked about
statements he made prior to his appearance in the court, which are inconsistent with
his president evidence. If he admits that he made a previous statement which is
inconsistent with the evidence he is now giving, that statement is admissible to
discredit the truth of his evidence.”).
38 Myers, supra note 18, at 318 (“Expert testimony on CSAAS is admissible to
rehabilitate a child’s credibility following impeachment focused on delayed reporting,
inconsistency, or recantation. Such rehabilitation is appropriate because jurors may
not understand that delayed reporting, recantation, and inconsistency are relatively
common among sexually abused children.”).
39 Summit, supra note 2 at 181.
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abuse.”40 The secrecy aspect “is an intrinsic characteristic”
because child sexual abuse generally occurs when the offender
is secluded with the child.41
For obvious reasons, the abuser must ensure that the
illicit encounters with the child are kept completely secret from
society, especially from other adults and the police. In order to
ensure secrecy, the abuser uses intimidation tactics to scare
the child into silence.42 For example, the abuser may say, “If you
tell anyone our secret, I will hurt you.”43 These threats “make[ ] it
clear to the child that this is something bad and dangerous” so
the secrecy acts as “both the source of fear and the promise of
safety” for the child.44 Because the child is lead to believe that
she is doing something bad, the child believes her abuser when
he says, “‘Everything will be all right if you just don’t tell.’”45
The secrecy element of child sexual abuse stories is
extremely common; the “majority of the victims in [Summit’s]
surveys had never told anyone” about their childhood abuse.46
This plays out in practice as many abused children keep their
abuse a secret because they are afraid of the repercussions.47
Many fear that they would face blame for their actions, that
their parents would not believe them, or that their parents
would be upset with them for not immediately disclosing the
abuse to them.48
B. Helplessness
Helplessness is the second “childhood vulnerability”
that serves as a “precondition to the occurrence of sexual
abuse” of a child, especially when the abuse comes from a
familiar (non-stranger) adult.49 “Helplessness . . . refers to the
power imbalance between children and adult perpetrators and
is a factor in both the initiation of sexual assault and
maintenance of secrecy.”50 Children do not share equal power
with adults, both physically and socially.51 Because the abuser
40 Weiss & Alexander, supra note 21, at 413.
41 Id.
42 Summit, supra note 2 at 181.
43 See id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Summit, supra note 2 at 182.
47 Id. (internal citation omitted).
48 Id.
49 Id. at 177.
50 Weiss & Alexander, supra note 21, at 413.
51 Summit, supra note 2, at 182.
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is often someone the child loves and trusts, the power imbalance
increases and the child’s helplessness is further underscored.52
The imbalance of power intensifies when the abuser is a parent
because the parent is “in control of material resources,” can
influence other people important to the child, and has decision-
making power over the child.53 Because of this imbalance of
power, the majority of victims are forced to endure their
abuse.54 Unlike adult victims who can fight back, scream for
help, or try to escape, children feel helpless against this adult
figure against whom they are physically powerless.55
C. Entrapment and Accommodation
Entrapment and accommodation is the first of three
characteristics that are contingent upon the abuse having
taken place.56 Summit argues that until these helpless children
break the secret and seek assistance from another adult or the
police, the child is forced “to learn to accept the situation and to
survive.”57 This means a “healthy, normal, emotionally resilient
child will learn to accommodate to the reality of continuing
sexual abuse.”58
Because children have a hard time differentiating
between a trusted adult who is caring and a trusted adult who
is callous, child victims think they have “provoked the painful
encounters” and believe that by accommodating the sexual
demands of their abusers and keeping the secret, they “can
earn love and acceptance” from their abusers whom they are
already wired to trust.59 Because child victims feel they must
protect their abusive parents—from getting caught, going to
jail, and sending them and their siblings to foster care—they
52 Id.
53 Weiss & Alexander, supra note 21, at 413.
54 Summit, supra note 2, at 183.
55 Id. at 182. Summit points out the common reasons why children do not
speak out against trusted adults who are sexually abusing them. He specifically
condemns the work of judges and attorneys who question children who did not report
their abuse. He writes, “It is sad to hear children attacked by attorneys and discredited
by juries because they claimed to be molested yet admitted they had made no protest or
outcry.” Id. at 183. While it is essential for the attorney of an accused parent to cross-
examine a child to discover why the child did not report the abuse, this author
acknowledges that the child is further attacked both by these questions in the court
room, and later on. It is for this reason that this note provides ways to use CSAAS
evidence to produce an acquittal, without the need for further harm to the child.
56 Id. at 177.
57 Id. at 184.
58 Id.
59 Id.
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must find a way to escape reality and deal with the abuse.60
Some children may develop an imaginary friend, create
multiple personalities, or disassociate themselves from the
body being abused.61
If child victims cannot accommodate the abuse as
described, they will express their helplessness and rage in
other ways.62 For example, these emotions “often lead[ ] to self-
destruction and reinforcement of self-hate[,] self-mutilation,
suicidal behavior, promiscuous sexual activity and repeated
runaways . . . .”63 Daughters being sexually abused by their
fathers will seek gifts and privileges for being exploited.64
Abused children will also express their emotions by fighting
with their parents (especially the mother whom the child
blames for being abused and allowing the abuse to continue).65
“The failure of the mother-daughter bond reinforces the young
woman’s distrust of herself as a female and makes her all the
more dependent on the pathetic hope of gaining acceptance and
protection with an abusive male.”66 Many victims also turn to
substance abuse to help them escape the realities of their abuse
or to experience the emotions that they are suppressing.67
D. Delayed, Conflicted, and Unconvincing Disclosure
The majority of children who are sexually abused never
disclose their painful experiences.68 As the child grows up, an
abusive father may become jealous of his child’s relationships,
and may try to control the child’s involvement with others.69
Particularly with young girls, to cope, the children often rebel
against their fathers, as described above.70 As a result, they
may face punishment by their parents.71 In a typical case, an
abused girl may become enraged after a particularly
“punishing family fight and a belittling showdown of authority
by the father” and may tell her secret to the police.72 Police
60 Id. at 185.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 185-86 (internal citation omitted).
68 Id. at 186 (internal citations omitted).
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
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authorities, however, may assume her claims are fictional,
especially in cases where she may have waited years to disclose
her story.73 The police may also “assume she has invented the
story in retaliation against the father’s attempts to achieve
reasonable control and discipline;” the more intense the
punishment is, the more likely they are to assume she is trying
to “falsely incriminat[e] her father.”74
Because all abused children accommodate their abuse
differently, they may face diverse disclosure difficulties.75 For
example, some children are able to completely hide their abuse
by excelling in school or achieving popularity; they are “eager
to please both teachers and peers.”76 These children often face
skeptical adults who are unable to believe their disclosures of
abuse because the children have excelled at school and their
extra-curricular activities and appear to be unaffected.77
Summit explains that children generally, regardless of
how they deal with their abuse, “face[ ] an unbelieving
audience when [they] complain of ongoing sexual abuse” and
risk “not only disbelief, but scapegoating, humiliation and
punishment as well.”78 As a result, abused children often see no
reason to voice the complaint.79 “Whether the child is
delinquent, hypersexual, countersexual, suicidal, hysterical,
psychotic, or perfectly well-adjusted, and whether the child is
angry, evasive or serene” the parents will ignore “the
immediate affect and the adjustment pattern of the child” and
will try to explain away the child’s allegations.80
E. Retraction
Unfortunately, when children disclose their abuse,
generally the threats made by their abusers become true: the
child is called a liar, the child’s family is broken apart, and/or
the child is taken away from the family home.81 Often the
mother guilts the child into retracting the statements about the
abuse as a result of the disruption caused to the family.82 “Once
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 187.
78 Id. at 186.
79 Id. at 187.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 188.
82 Id.
2015] A LAWYER’S GUIDE 1163
again, the child bears the responsibility of either preserving or
destroying the family.”83 Telling the truth no longer seems the
best choice, but instead the child must lie and recant, in order
to preserve the family.84 “Unless there is special support for the
child and immediate intervention to force responsibility on the
[abuser], the [child] will follow the ‘normal’ course and retract
[the] complaint.”85 The child will pretend the story was initially
fabricated and give an excuse for initially fibbing; the adults
will then believe this false version of events.86
II. ADMITTANCE OF CSAAS EVIDENCE IN COURTS
Summit did not intend for CSAAS testimony “to prove
that abuse occurred.”87 Instead, he intended for it “to explain how
children who are abused react to their maltreatment.”88 By
identifying prototypical behaviors, he aimed to provide therapists
with a nondiagnostic tool, and not “a device for establishing the
truth of a child’s statement.”89 This intention, however, was not
clear from his initial article, and both prosecutors and defense
attorneys alike were exploiting Summit’s 1983 article to advance
their own legal arguments.90 Consequently, in 1992, in his article
entitled “Abuse of the Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation
Syndrome” Summit “attempted . . . to clear up some of the
confusion surrounding [CSAAS’s] proper use and reliability.”91
Following the publishing of his 1983 article, CSAAS was
used against criminal defendants on trial for child sexual
assault and in family courts. Some prosecutors and experts
argued that CSAAS was “akin to a diagnosis”92 and argued that
if children exhibited the “prototypical behaviors” of victims “a
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Myers, supra note 18, at 309.
88 Id.
89 Lucy Berliner, The Use of Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases,
in EXPERT WITNESSES IN CHILD ABUSE CASES: WHAT CAN AND SHOULD BE SAID IN
COURT 11, 17 (Stephen J. Ceci & Helene Hembrooke eds.,1998).
90 See generally Roland C. Summit, Abuse of the Child Sexual Abuse
Accommodation Syndrome, 1 J. CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 153 (1992); Weiss & Alexander,
supra note 21, at 414.
91 Cara Gitlin, Note, Expert Testimony on Child Sexual Abuse
Accommodation Syndrome: How Proper Screening Should Severely Limit its Admission,
26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 497, 515 n.120 (2008) (citing Summit, supra note 90).
92 Id.
1164 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:3
psychologist [could] infer that abuse ha[d] occurred.”93
Accordingly, judges generally allowed CSAAS testimony to be
admitted into evidence as proof that child sexual abuse had
occurred.94 For example, in Bussey v. Commonwealth of
Kentucky, one of the earliest cases to evaluate CSAAS evidence
by name, there was no dispute that CSAAS evidence was proof
of abuse.95 Rather, the dispute centered on whether CSAAS
evidence could be admitted against the defendant, the victim’s
father, when it was a proven fact that the victim was
previously sexually abused by her uncles.96
Today, the majority of state courts (“the majority states”)
to address the admissibility of CSAAS evidence have barred it as
proof that abuse has occurred.97 Most of these courts, however,
do permit CSAAS testimony for other purposes.98 “For example,
if the facts of a particular case show that the victim delayed
reporting the abuse, recanted the allegations, kept the abuse
secretive, or was accommodating to the abuse, then testimony
93 Margaret Bull Kovera & Eugene Borgida, Expert Scientific Testimony on
Child Witnesses in the Age of Dalbert, in EXPERT WITNESSES IN CHILD ABUSE CASES:
WHAT CAN AND SHOULD BE SAID IN COURT 185, 197 (Stephen J. Ceci & Helene
Hembrooke eds., 1998).
94 Michael D. Stanger, Throwing the Baby Out with the Bathwater: Why
Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome Should Be Allowed As A Rehabilitative
Tool in the Florida Courts, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 561, 581 (2001) (collecting cases).
95 Bussey v. Commonwealth, 697 S.W.2d 139, 140 (Ky. 1985).
96 Id.
97 Stanger, supra note 94, at 570 (citing State v. York, 564 A.2d 389 (Me.
1989); State v. Chamberlain, 628 A.2d 704 (N.H. 1993); State v. Schimpf, 782 S.W.2d
186 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989); State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989); State v.
Gokey 574 A.2d 766 (Vt. 1990); State v. Jones, 863 P.2d 85 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993); State
v. Jensen, 415 N.W.2d 519 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987)).
98 People v. Spicola, 947 N.E.2d 620, 635 (N.Y. 2011) (“[T]he majority of states
‘permit expert testimony to explain delayed reporting, recantation, and inconsistency,’ as
well as ‘to explain why some abused children are angry, why some children want to live
with the person who abused them, why a victim might appear “emotionally flat” following
sexual assault, why a child might run away from home, and for other purposes.’” (quoting
1 MYERS, EVIDENCE § 6.24, at 416-22)); see People v. Sandoval, 79 Cal. Rptr. 3d 634, 639
(Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (“Such expert testimony is needed to disabuse jurors of commonly
held misconceptions about child sexual abuse, and to explain the emotional antecedents
of abused children’s seemingly self-impeaching behavior.”) (internal citations and
quotations omitted); see also, e.g., W.R.C. v. State, 69 So. 3d 933, 937-39 (Ala. Crim. App.
2010); State v. Moran, 728 P.2d 248, 253-54 (Ariz. 1986); People v. Bowker, 249 Cal.Rptr.
886, 891 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); People v. Beckley, 456 N.W.2d 391, 409-10 (Mich. 1990);
State v. Schnabel, 952 A.2d 452, 462 (N.J. 2008); Frenzel v. State, 849 P.2d 741, 749
(Wyo. 1993); but see, e.g., Hadden v. State, 690 So. 2d 573, 580 n.5 (Fla. 1997) (finding
CSAAS evidence inadmissible because such evidence does not satisfy the Frye test);
Sanderson v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W.3d 610, 614 (Ky. 2009) (finding CSAAS testimony
to never be admissible under Kentucky law); State v. Doan, 498 N.W.2d 804, 812 (Neb.
1993) (finding CSAAS evidence to be inadmissible because it takes the credibility
determination away from the trier of fact in violation of Nebraska law); Commonwealth v.
Dunkle, 602 A.2d 830, 836 (Pa. 1992) (finding CSAAS testimony to be too speculative to
be properly admitted to a jury in a criminal trial).
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about that particular characteristic of CSAAS would be
admissible to dispel any myths the [trier of fact] may hold
concerning that behavior.”99 Because CSAAS is admitted only
for these limited reasons, experts who testify about CSAAS
often take the witness stand without ever having met the child
and with no knowledge of the case; his or her testimony only
conveys to the court the common characteristics of children
who have been sexually abused to rehabilitate the child’s
testimony.100 Some courts also allow CSAAS evidence to be
admitted to imply that the child’s behavior is consistent with
that of an abused child, but this implication evidence is still
only permitted as long as the expert “refrains from giving an
explicit opinion on whether the abuse occurred” in that
particular case101
Even under these limitations, CSAAS may still be
misleading to the fact-finder.102 Although today CSAAS expert
testimony is generally not introduced into evidence as proof of
abuse, the general message of this testimony is that the fact-
finder, “should believe the initial accusations made by a child
and disbelieve the recantation.”103 This is particularly
troublesome in criminal proceedings where lay members of the
jury will interpret this testimony to mean that the expert
believes the accusations to be true, taking away the credibility
determination from the jury.104 Judges generally give a limiting
instruction105 in criminal proceedings explaining that “such
99 Frenzel, 849 P.2d at 749.
100 See generally Spicola, 947 N.E.2d at 635 (finding the judge did not abuse
his discretion in admitting CSAAS testimony by an expert who did not know the facts
of the case and explained general information about CSAAS).
101 Stanger, supra note 94, at 570 (citing United States v. Bighead, 128 F.3d
1329 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. St. Pierre, 812 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 1987);
Rodriquez v. State, 741 P.2d 1200 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987); State v. Reser, 767 P.2d 1277
(Kan. 1989); State v. Edelman, 593 N.W.2d 419, (S.D. 1999); State v. Bachman, 446
N.W.2d 271 (S.D. 1989); Gokey, 574 A.2d at 766).
102 Weiss & Alexander, supra note 21, at 412-13 (“A clinician testifying that an
evaluee has one of these conditions and that the only explanation for it is the criminal
conduct of the defendant would tend to prejudice a jury . . . Overall, however, evidence
of syndromes in court proceedings has been criticized as a major source of confusion,
especially in sexual assault cases. This problem is particularly true of child sexual
abuse and CSAAS testimony.”) (internal citations omitted); see Berliner, supra note 89,
at 17 (“Unfortunately, in some cases, prosecutors offered and clinical experts testified
that this syndrome was akin to a diagnosis and its presence was proof of a sexual abuse
history. In part, the use of the term syndrome contributed to the confusion . . . .”).
103 Newkirk v. Commonwealth, 937 S.W.2d 690, 693 (Ky. 1996).
104 See id. at 694.
105 See Frenzel v. State, 849 P.2d 741, 749 (Wyo. 1993).
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testimony is admitted only to explain victim behavior and is
inadmissible on the issue of guilt.”106
Because CSAAS testimony may mislead the jury, courts
in criminal trials “struggle with balancing testimony on
CSAAS-related behaviors against the implication that the child
was, in fact, abused” and admittance of this evidence is often in
the face of many strong objections by defense counsel.107 This
balancing can be so difficult that “as a result of . . . the failure
of some courts to distinguish proper and improper use of the
syndrome, testimony that relies on or refers to CSAAS has
been virtually banned in some jurisdictions,” 108 including
Florida, Kentucky, Pennsylvania,109 and Nebraska110 (“the
minority states”).
In the majority states, experienced attorneys defending
those accused of child sexual abuse often challenge the
admittance of CSAAS testimony into evidence under the state
equivalent of Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which
governs the admittance of expert testimony.111 In Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,112 the United States Supreme
Court rejected the previously established “Frye test,”113 which
regulated expert testimony, finding that it was replaced by
Rule 703.114 The Supreme Court in Daubert established a two-
part test for judges to employ to interpret Rule 703
accurately—the testimony must be “scientific knowledge” and
106 Weiss & Alexander, supra note 21, at 412-13 (internal citation omitted) .
107 Id. at 414-15 (internal citation omitted).
108 Berliner, supra note 89, at 17 (internal citation omitted). This note, thus, is
meant to aid attorneys in jurisdictions where CSAAS has not been banned.
109 Stanger supra note 94, at 572 (citing Hester v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d
457 (Ky. 1987); Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 602 A.2d 830 (Pa. 1992)); see Hadden v.
State, 690 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1997).
110 State v. Doan, 498 N.W.2d 804, 812 (Neb. 1993).
111 Weiss & Alexander, supra note 21, at 415 (citing FED. R. EVID. 703). Rule
703 reads, “An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert
has been made aware of or personally observed. If experts in the particular field would
reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject,
they need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted. But if the facts or data
would otherwise be inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may disclose them to the
jury only if their probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially
outweighs their prejudicial effect.” FED. R. EVID. 703.
112 509 U.S. 579, 570 (1993).
113 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The Frye test requires
expert testimony be “generally accepted in the scientific community.” David McCord,
Expert Psychological Testimony About Child Complainants in Sexual Abuse
Prosecutions: A Foray Into the Admissibility of Novel Psychological Evidence, 77 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 10 (1986) (internal citation omitted).
114 Dana G. Deaton, The Daubert Challenge to the Admissibility of Scientific
Evidence, 60 AM. JUR. TRIALS 17-18 (1996) (internal citation omitted).
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must “logically advance[ ] a material aspect of the case.”115 The
trial court judges, in applying this two-part test, must act as
“gatekeepers” and determine, at the beginning of the trial,
whether the testimony will be admitted.116
A “Daubert hearing is an ideal venue to test the validity
and reliability of the syndrome.”117 Daubert hearings “allow [for
an] inquiry into whether the syndrome is diagnostic or
nondiagnostic.”118 If the court determines “the syndrome is
nondiagnostic,” as Summit intended, evidence of the syndrome
cannot be admitted as substantive evidence of abuse against
the accused.119 “If the syndrome is diagnostic, the hearing
affords an opportunity to locate the syndrome along the
continuum of diagnostic certainty.”120
In jurisdictions that allow for CSAAS evidence to be
admitted, judges must determine in what capacity this
testimony may be admitted against the accused. For example,
in 1993 the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. J.Q. held
“that CSAAS has a sufficiently reliable scientific basis to allow
an expert witness to describe traits found in victims of such
abuse to aid jurors in evaluating specific defenses.”121 Although
the New Jersey Supreme Court found CSAAS testimony to be
reliable, the court also found the lower court had erred in
admitting the CSAAS testimony against that defendant.122 The
court stated that the expert’s testimony “included opinions on
commonplace issues, such as credibility assessments derived
from conflicting versions of an event and not-yet scientifically
established opinions” which were the ultimate issues the fact-
finder was to resolve.123
III. CSAAS ACROSS THE COUNTRY
There are few, if any, published family court judicial
opinions that rely on CSAAS testimony in custody and visitation
determinations; rather, published cases discussing CSAAS
testimony generally take place in child sexual abuse criminal
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Myers, supra note 18, at 309.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 State v. J.Q., 617 A.2d 1196, 1197 (N.J. 1993).
122 Id.
123 Id. at 1197-98.
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proceedings.124 Although there is vast difference between
criminal proceedings and family court proceedings—the burden
of proof, the stakes, the parties, the trier of fact—criminal
proceedings involving CSAAS can serve as a learning tool for
attorneys representing parents against whom CSAAS may be
admitted. These attorneys must keep in mind, however, that
family court and criminal court operate by completely different
rules and that family courts may treat CSAAS evidence
differently than criminal courts. The following cases outline the
three main avenues courts can take when determining whether
to admit CSAAS testimony.
A. New Jersey: State v. J.Q.125
State v. J.Q. is a child-sexual-abuse criminal case in
which two young girls, Connie and Norma, accused their father
of sexually abusing them.126 The girls’ parents, Karen and John,
met in the early 1970s and began a relationship.127 The couple
did not marry, but gave birth to their daughters in 1977 and
1979.128 Due to financial issues and allegations of
unfaithfulness, Karen and John separated in 1984.129 The
couple officially ended their relationship shortly thereafter
when Connie was eight years old and Norma was six years
old.130 After the breakup, John would spend time on the
weekends with his daughters at his one-room apartment he
shared with a woman he later married in 1987.131
Two years later, “Karen learned that Norma, during
play, had attempted to pull down her younger sister’s underwear
and touch her buttocks.”132 After being questioned by her
mother, Norma identified her father as the person who taught
her to behave in that manner.133 Although incredulous to her
124 E.g., id. at 1197; W.R.C. v. State, 69 So. 3d 933 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010);
Sanderson v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W.3d 610 (Ky. 2009).
125 Under New Jersey law, child sexual abuse opinions should be written
using initials, rather than the parties’ names in order to protect the identities of the
parties. The Supreme Court of New Jersey decided to “use fictitious names to describe
the parents and children involved . . . refer[ing] to the mother as ‘Karen,’ the father as
‘John,’ and the two children as ‘Connie’ and ‘Norma.’” J.Q., 617 A.2d at 1198.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
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daughter’s allegations initially, Norma eventually contacted a
counselor and the police.134
At John’s trial, Dr. Milchman, a psychologist, testified
“as an expert witness on child sexual abuse” about CSAAS.135
She described CSAAS “as a pattern of behavior that is found to
occur again and again in children who are victims of incest.”136
Dr. Milchman described the elements of CSAAS and testified to
their relevance in the cases of Connie and Norma.137 Dr.
Milchman testified that “in her expert opinion, Connie and
Norma had been sexually abused.”138
John was convicted “of multiple counts of first-degree
aggravated sexual assault on Connie and Norma for various
acts of penetration and oral sex, and of two counts of
endangering the welfare of a child . . . [and] sentenced . . . to
thirty years’ imprisonment, with ten years of parole
ineligibility.”139 The conviction was reversed, however, when
the Appellate Division found the trial court had admitted
CSAAS evidence to “establish the credibility” of the children
rather than to rehabilitate them, such as to explain why
disclosure of abuse was delayed.140
In affirming the decision, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey embarked on a lengthy discussion of the use of
behavioral science in child sexual abuse cases.141 Despite an
abundance of both legal and medical literature in favor of using
behavioral science evidence, the court stated that “most courts
do not approve such testimony as substantive evidence of
abuse.”142 Instead, the court found that many states permit
behavioral science testimony to be admitted for other purposes
such as “to rehabilitate” the victim after the defense argues the
victim is untrustworthy since she has recanted her story or
delayed in reporting her abuse.143
The court next considered whether behavioral science
could be used by an expert witness to state whether in his or
her expert opinion a child was sexually abused.144 Although
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
137 Id. at 1199.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. (citing State v. J.Q., 599 A.2d 172 (1991)).
141 Id. at 1200-03.
142 Id. at 1201 (internal quotation marks omitted).
143 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
144 Id.
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only citing two occasions where other courts allowed behavioral
science testimony to be used in this way,145 the court left open
“the possibility that a qualified behavioral-science expert could
demonstrate a sufficiently reliable scientific opinion to aid a
jury in determining the ultimate issue that the abuse had
occurred” under the right circumstances.146 Relying on the
literature, the court directed future trial court judges to
evaluate the witness’s qualifications to determine if the witness
possesses “the requisite degree of scientific reliability” before
allowing an expert to testify in this manner.147
Next, the court turned specifically to CSAAS
testimony.148 The court noted that CSAAS testimony “has been
placed within the category of behavioral-science testimony that
describes behaviors commonly observed in sexually-abused
children.”149 Despite the strength of the literature backing
behavioral-science testimony such as CSAAS, “[c]ourts rarely
permit the testimony for the purpose of establishing substantive
evidence of abuse, but [generally] allow it to rehabilitate the
victim’s testimony.”150 For example, CSAAS evidence may be
admitted after “the defense asserts that the child’s delay in
reporting the abuse and recanting of the story indicate that the
child is unworthy of belief.” 151 After a detailed analysis of
Summit’s work and the CSAAS elements, the court looked to
whether CSAAS testimony is admissible under New Jersey
law.152 It explained that expert testimony is only admissible
under Rule 56 of the New Jersey Rules of Evidence153 when “it
relates to a subject-matter beyond the understanding of
persons of ordinary experience, intelligence, and knowledge,”154
and has “[a]cceptance within [the] scientific community.”155
The court acknowledged that the scientific community
has accepted the “theory that CSAAS identifies or describes
145 Id. at 1202 (citing Myers et al., supra note 30, at 80-85).
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 1203.
149 Id.
150 Id. (internal citations omitted).
151 Id. at 1201 (internal citation omitted).
152 Id. at 1205.
153 Rule 56 has been replaced and amended by Rule 702 of the New Jersey
Rules of Evidence. State v. Berry, 658 A.2d 702, 707 (N.J. 1995).
154 J.Q., 617 A.2d at 1205 (citing State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1993);
Evers v. Dollinger, 471 A.2d 405 (N.J. 1984)).
155 Id. (citing State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1993)).
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behavioral traits commonly found in child-abuse victims.”156 It
noted, however, that there is criticism of CSAAS evidence
because there is overlap between the CSAAS behaviors and
those observed in other syndromes.157 Thus, the court came to
the single, most-important realization that attorneys must
remember when their clients are facing CSAAS evidence: “the
existence of the symptoms does not invariably prove abuse.”158
As a result, the court established that in New Jersey CSAAS
evidence could only be “presented to the jury in accordance
with its scientific theory,” namely why a child accommodated
the abuse or did not disclose promptly.159
Finally, the court analyzed whether in J.Q. Dr.
Milchman’s expert CSAAS testimony was properly admitted
before the jury.160 While the court was unclear whether Dr.
Milchman’s opinion that the children were sexually abused was
reached “on the basis of her credibility assessments or on the
basis of her understanding of CSAAS evidence,” the court held
that her opinion was improperly admitted.161 If her opinion was
based on her understanding of CSAAS evidence, the court held
that the evidence would be improperly admitted “because
CSAAS is not relied on in the scientific community to detect
abuse.”162 The court further explained:
Summit did not intend the accommodation syndrome as a diagnostic
device. The syndrome does not detect sexual abuse. Rather, it
assumes the presence of abuse, and explains the child’s reactions to
it . . . With child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome . . . one
reasons from presence of sexual abuse to reactions to sexual abuse.
Thus, the accommodation syndrome is not probative of abuse.163
The court further endorsed the use of CSAAS testimony
to rehabilitate children in the courtroom setting.164 Adopting
the comments of Professor John E. B. Myers and his colleagues,
the court stated that CSAAS can justify why many children
who have been abused recant their allegations or delay
156 Id. at 1206 (internal citation omitted); Chandra Lorraine Holmes, Child
Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome: Curing the Effects of a Misdiagnosis in the
Law of Evidence, 25 TULSA L.J. 143, 158-59 (1989)).
157 J.Q., 617 A.2d at 1206.
158 Id. (emphasis added).
159 Id. at 1207.
160 J.Q., 617 A.2d at 1209.
161 Id.
162 Id. (internal citation omitted).
163 Id. (internal citation omitted).
164 Id.
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disclosing their abuse.165 Furthermore, the court found that, “[i]f
use of the syndrome is confined to these rehabilitative functions,
the confusion clears, and the accommodation syndrome serves a
useful forensic function.”166 Because Dr. Milchman’s CSAAS
testimony was not used for this rehabilitative function, the court
reasoned that her testimony was improperly admitted. 167
The New Jersey Supreme Court stuck as closely to
Summit’s intent as possible.168 As a result, the J.Q. decision
became instrumental in helping other states’ highest courts,
including the Supreme Court of Kentucky, to establish whether
and how their state would admit CSAAS evidence.169
B. Kentucky: Sanderson v. Commonwealth of Kentucky170
One of the first states to consider CSAAS testimony in
1985, Kentucky has historically rejected the admittance of
CSAAS testimony into evidence.171 The Supreme Court of
Kentucky “has not accepted the view that . . . CSAAS or any of
its components has attained general acceptance in the scientific
community justifying its admission into evidence to prove
sexual abuse or the identity of the perpetrator.”172 Historically,
Kentucky courts have rejected CSAAS evidence on relevance
grounds, finding CSAAS evidence does not “make the existence
of any fact of consequence more probable or less probable than
it would have been without the evidence.”173 In Sanderson v.
Commonwealth of Kentucky, the Supreme Court of Kentucky
further expressed its distaste for CSAAS, describing it as
165 Id. at 1210 (internal citation omitted) (“Since this ‘syndrome’ is only a piece
of the child sexual abuse machinery, testimony concerning CSAAS may only be offered
for the purpose for which it was defined—to explain the child’s irrational behavior.”).
166 Id. at 1209.
167 Id. at 1211.
168 See generally id. at 1209 (internal citation omitted).
169 E.g., Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490 (Ind. 1995); Sanderson v.
Commonwealth, 291 S.W.3d 610 (Ky. 2009); Commonwealth v. Hudson, 631 N.E.2d 50
(Mass. 1994); People v. Peterson, 537 N.W.2d 857 (Mich. 1995).
170 291 S.W.3d at 610.
171 Id. at 617 (Scott, J. dissenting) (citing Kurtz v. Commonwealth, 172 S.W.3d
409, 413, 414 (Ky. 2005); Miller v. Commonwealth, 77 S.W.3d 566, 571, 572 (Ky. 2002);
Newkirk v. Commonwealth, 937 S.W.2d 690, 691-96 (Ky. 1996); Hall v. Commonwealth,
862 S.W.2d 321, 322, 323 (Ky. 1993); Hellstrom v. Commonwealth, 825 S.W.2d 612, 613,
614 (Ky.1992); Dyer v. Commonwealth, 816 S.W.2d 647, 652-54 (Ky. 1991); Brown v.
Commonwealth, 812 S.W.2d 502, 503, 504 (Ky. 1991); Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 777
S.W.2d 930, 932, 933 (Ky. 1989); Hester v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 457, 458 (Ky.
1987); Lantrip v. Commonwealth,713 S.W.2d 816, 817 (Ky. 1986); Bussey v.
Commonwealth, 697 S.W.2d 139, 140, 141 (Ky.1985)).
172 Newkirk, 937 S.W.2d at 693.
173 Id. (citing KY. R. EVID. 401).
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“generic and unreliable.”174 The facts of Sanderson are simple—
the complainant, B.T., alleged she had been sexually abused by
her step-father.175
In December 2000, the appellant married Mendy, the
mother of B.T.176 After the wedding, Mendy and B.T. “moved
into [the] Appellant’s house” which included a garage.177 In
2006, B.T. accused her step-father of abusing her multiple
times each week since the family moved in together.178 B.T.
testified that her step-father threatened to hurt her if she ever
tried to disclose the abuse.179 B.T. testified that the abuse
always “took place in the garage,” and after the family moved
to a new home, the abuse occurred “in the garage, in B.T.’s
room, and in Mendy’s room.”180
After Mendy and the appellant had a baby, they began
“experiencing marital problems.”181 The couple sought divorce,
and the appellant left the marital home on February 25,
2006.182 Two months later, a parent of one of B.T.’s friends told
Mendy that during a visit to the marital home years earlier,
her daughter “watched a pornographic movie with B.T. and
Appellant.”183 Although initially denying the story, B.T.
eventually admitted to Mendy that she had “watched the movie
and told Mendy about the abuse that had taken place.”184
The appellant was eventually indicted, and was
convicted by a jury “of two counts of Second-Degree Sodomy
and three counts of First-Degree Sexual abuse.”185 He “was
sentenced to thirty-five years in prison.”186 On appeal, the
Appellant argued that the trial court erred in admitting
CSAAS evidence against him.187
The appellant objected to the CSAAS symptom
testimony “from Mendy, Brian Terrell (B.T.’s father), and Lori
Brown, a clinical psychologist.”188 All three witnesses testified
174 Sanderson, 291 S.W.3d at 614.
175 Id. at 611.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 612.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id.
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to “B.T.’s physical and psychological ‘symptoms,’” but “the most
damaging testimony came from Brown, a clinical psychologist
who counseled B.T. and gave testimony that B.T.’s addition of
new allegations of sexual abuse [wa]s normal.”189
The Supreme Court of Kentucky evaluated the State’s
precedent that generally rejected the introduction of CSAAS
evidence.190 The general rule against CSAAS testimony was
established inMiller v. Commonwealth:
[A] party cannot introduce evidence of the habit of a class of
individuals either to prove that another member of the class acted
the same way under similar circumstances or to prove that the
person was a member of that class because he/she acted the same
way under similar circumstances.191
Essentially, this means that “[w]here a victim had
delayed reporting of abuse, [it is] improper [to admit] testimony
of a seasoned child sex abuse investigator [to] state[ ] that it
was common, in her experience, for sexually abused victims to
delay reporting of the abuse.”192 Building off that rule, the
Kentucky Supreme Court further showed its distrust of CSAAS
testimony in Newkirk v. Commonwealth of Kentucky.193 There,
the court stated that there are many reasons to exclude CSAAS
testimony including: “the lack of diagnostic reliability, the lack
of general acceptance within the discipline from which such
testimony emanates, and the overwhelmingly persuasive
nature of such testimony effectively dominating the decision-
making process, uniquely the function of the jury.” 194
With this precedent in mind, the court examined
Brown’s testimony.195 Although never mentioning CSAAS
specifically, “Brown testified that it is normal for child victims
of sexual abuse, like B.T., to add details about their abuse after
they have been in counseling for an extended period of time
and to appear happy in their outward life . . . .”196 The court
found error with this testimony, however, describing it as “the
exact type of generic and unreliable evidence this court has
repeatedly held to be reversible error.”197 The court reversed the
189 Id.
190 Id. at 613.
191 Miller v. Commonwealth, 77 S.W.3d 566, 572 (Ky. 2002) (emphasis in original).
192 Sanderson, 291 S.W.3d at 613 (internal quotation marks omitted).
193 Newkirk v. Commonwealth, 937 S.W.2d 690 (Ky. 1996).
194 Sanderson, 291 S.W.3d at 613 (internal quotation marks omitted).
195 Id. at 614.
196 Id.
197 Id.
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conviction and remanded the case to the trial court for a new
trial due to the improper CSAAS testimony admitted.198
The Sanderson case is an important tool for attorneys in
Kentucky defending against sexual abuse allegations.
Moreover, this case provides a basis for attorneys in other
jurisdictions to mount objections to the introduction of CSAAS
evidence to substantiate children’s claims of sexual abuse. In
fact, Sanderson outlines the key arguments against CSAAS
evidence, specifically noting its unreliable nature.
C. Alabama:W.R.C. v. State199
Attorneys representing clients accused of sexual abuse
of a child in Alabama do not have the same precedential
backing to object to the use of CSAAS evidence at trial.
Recently, when faced with an analogous issue to that of the
Kentucky Supreme Court in Sanderson, the Alabama Court of
Criminal Appeals,200 in W.R.C. v. State, declined to follow the
Sanderson holding and instead found that CSAAS testimony
may be admitted against the defendant when the testimony
relates to child victims generally and not to specific victims.201
At the trial of W.R.C., the prosecutor admitted CSAAS
evidence against him.202 A jury convicted W.R.C. of first degree
sodomy and sexual abuse, and he was sentenced to a total of 30
years imprisonment.203 W.R.C. appealed his conviction,
specifically objecting to the admittance of CSAAS evidence
against him at his trial.204
The alleged victim, L.O., who “lived with his
grandmother, E.O.,” accused his grandmother’s husband,
W.R.C., of sexually abusing him “over the span of a month”
when he was seven years old (10 years before the start of
trial).205 L.O. testified that following the abuse “W.R.C. told him
to ‘keep this between us’ and threatened that if L.O. told anyone,
he would kill both L.O. and E.O.”206
198 Id.
199 W.R.C. v. State, 69 So. 3d 933 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010).
200 The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals is the intermediate appellate court
in Alabama. Ala. Appellate Courts, Judicial System Chart, JUDICIAL.ALABAMA.GOV,
http://judicial.alabama.gov/chart_judicial.cfm (last visited Jan. 11, 2015).
201 W.R.C., 69 So. 3d at 939-40 (citing Sanderson, 291 S.W.3d at 610).
202 Id. at 936.
203 Id. at 934.
204 Id. at 934-36.
205 Id. at 934.
206 Id. at 935.
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At trial L.O. listed a number of reasons to explain why he
did not disclose the abuse sooner: “because he did not want to
talk about it; because he knew no one else who was suffering
from something similar; because even though E.O. and W.R.C.
separated shortly after the incidents, they still communicated;
and because he did not want to hurt his grandmother.”207 L.O.
testified that when he was 15 or 16 years old, he finally disclosed
the assaults to an aunt with whom he was living.208
On appeal, W.R.C. argued “that the trial court erred in
allowing what he claims was expert testimony regarding
[CSAAS]209 and delayed disclosure by child sexual-abuse
victims from Maribeth Thomas, the clinical director of the
Prescott House Child Advocacy Center.”210 W.R.C. objected to
Thomas’s testimony at trial as well.211 In response to W.R.C.’s
objection, “the prosecutor pointed out that Thomas had never
interviewed or even met L.O. and that she was not going to
testify about L.O. at all,” but rather about behaviors common to
abused children across the country.212 Despite W.R.C.’s
objection, Thomas was deemed “an expert in child development
and child and adolescent sexual abuse.”213 During her
testimony, Thomas explained:
. . . that in her experience and based on research done in the subject
area, child victims of sexual or physical abuse do not always disclose
the abuse and that nondisclosure may be because the perpetrator is
an adult or a family member, because the child does not have the
vocabulary to describe the abuse, because the child fears the
consequences of disclosure, or because the perpetrator has
threatened the child . . . [;] “that both experientially and the research
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 As in Sanderson, the expert did not specifically testify to CSAAS evidence.
Nevertheless, the court, for purposes of the appeal, presumed that the expert’s
testimony related to CSAAS evidence. The court stated, “Thomas, however, did not testify
regarding any syndrome or about any ‘typical’ characteristics of abused children; her
testimony was limited to delayed disclosure by some child victims and the possible
reasons for such delayed disclosure. All of her testimony was based on her own experience
in working with abused children and on research that had been done in the field of
abused children. In addition, as noted above, Thomas specifically testified on cross-
examination that all children are different and that every child victim reacts differently
to abuse. Thus, we seriously question whether Thomas’s testimony can be considered
testimony regarding CSAAS. That being said, delayed disclosure is considered one
element of CSAAS, and, as such, Thomas’s testimony in this regard is not necessarily
outside the realm of CSAAS testimony. For the purposes of this opinion, then, we
presume that Thomas’s testimony falls within the category of CSAAS testimony, and we
address it as such.” Id. at 938.
210 Id. at 936.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 937.
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indicates that male victims are less likely to disclose than female
victims” . . . and that there is a “significant difference” between
males and females with respect to delayed disclosure . . . [;] that
when the perpetrator is a family member, both her experience and
research in the area indicate that child victims are more likely not to
disclose or to delay disclosure . . . [;] that statistics indicate child
sexual-abuse victims “more often than not” delay disclosing the
abuse . . . [;] that such delayed disclosure may be the result of a lack
of understanding of how to make the disclosure, which is why
sometimes children will disclose in the fifth or sixth grade, when the
state begins sex education for students . . . [;] that delayed disclosure
could be the result of fear by the child victim of the consequences of
disclosing the abuse . . . [; that] when disclosure is made, it is
typically made to someone the child victim trusts . . . [; and] that it is
not unusual for a child victim not to be able to provide a specific date
that the abuse occurred unless the abuse occurred on a typically
memorable day, such as Christmas or a birthday. 214
On cross-examination, defense counsel was able to
challenge Thomas, leading her to admit “that every child is
different and that not all children react the same way to
abuse—some child victims show no signs of dysfunction at all,
while others show dramatic signs of dysfunction.”215 The other
witnesses on cross-examination also admitted that “L.O.
exhibited no signs of dysfunction, had good grades in school,
and was active in extracurricular activities at school.”216
On appeal, W.R.C. argued that at his trial Thomas’s
CSAAS testimony was improperly admitted in violation of
Alabama Rule 702,217 because, since “there is no consensus in
the scientific community as to the ‘typical’ characteristics or
behaviors of sexually abused children, testimony about CSAAS
cannot satisfy the reliability requirement for admission” of
scientific evidence pursuant to Rule 702 and the Daubert
standard.218 The court clarified, however, that under Alabama
common law, nonscientific expert evidence is not subject to the
Daubert standard.219 Instead, nonscientific expert evidence may
be admitted under Rule 702 if the witness is “qualified as an
expert in the field” and the testimony “assist[s] the trier of
fact.”220 Here the court found that Rule 702 (as well as Rule
214 Id.
215 Id. at 937.
216 Id.
217 “If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise.” ALA. R. EVID. 702.
218 W.R.C., 69 So. 3d at 938.
219 Id. at 938-39 (internal citation omitted).
220 Id. at 939 (internal citation omitted).
1178 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:3
403)221 was satisfied since Thomas was declared as an expert by
the trial court in “child development and child and adolescent
sexual abuse,” and because her testimony about “delayed
disclosure” aided the jury in understanding why L.O. waited
almost a decade to disclose his abuse.222
Most importantly, the court pointed out that the
evidence was proper because Thomas did not testify specifically
about L.O., but instead about abused children generally.223
Thomas did not “testify that L.O.’s behavior was consistent
with children who had been sexually abused or that she
believed L.O.’s accusations.”224 Furthermore, Thomas never
said whether L.O. had suffered abuse.225
In Alabama, as a result of W.R.C., attorneys will most
likely have CSAAS evidence admitted against their clients.
They will, however, be able to limit the testimony to general
testimony about children who have been sexually abused, not
about the victim.
IV. OBJECTIONS TO CSAAS EVIDENCE
Custody proceedings generally take place in a state’s
Family Court, in front of a single judge who will determine the
fate of the family.226 In these proceedings, the rules of evidence
are often relaxed in order to allow the judge to obtain as much
information about the child and the parties as possible.227 The
relaxed evidentiary rules, combined with the admission of
CSAAS evidence, will present challenges to attorneys defending
a parent accused of sexual abuse. Although in the majority of
states CSAAS testimony is admissible to rehabilitate the child,
221 “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.” ALA. R. EVID. 403.
222 W.R.C., 69 So. 3d at 939.
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 GOLDZBAND, supra note 7, at 168 (“The tragedy rests on the fact that
judges are still called on to determine the disposition of fought-over children, even in
these supposedly enlightened days in which child advocacy is emerging as the
dominant trend in resolving custody battles.”).
227 See Mark Hardin, Child Protection Cases in A Unified Family Court, 32
FAM. L.Q. 147, 179 (1998); see generally Hon. Bruce A. Newman, Evidentiary Rules and
Standards of Proof in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 75 MICH. B.J. 1165, 1165-66
(1996) (explaining some of the unique rules in juvenile court including the admittance
of testimony of “prior bad acts” to show propensity and hearsay evidence); e.g., WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (West 2013).
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attorneys representing the accused parent should object to the
admittance of CSAAS testimony and outline the many
shortcomings of CSAAS to the judge.228
Under Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and its
state counterparts, parties seeking to admit expert testimony
of a witness during trial must put the court and the opposing
parties on notice.229 Consequently, attorneys representing the
accused parent will know in advance if opposing counsel
intends to admit expert testimony on CSAAS during the trial.
Once put on notice, the accused parent’s attorney should, prior
to trial, move to exclude any expert testimony on CSAAS under
a Daubert motion.230
Based on the shortcomings of CSAAS evidence
discussed supra, below I have delineated various arguments
attorneys representing clients accused of sexually abusing their
child should make in support of their motion to exclude expert
testimony on CSAAS. Each argument outlined below should, of
course, be briefed in their motion papers, as well. Attorneys
should not consider this to be a comprehensive list and should
make as many objections as possible.
A. CSAAS is Not a Diagnostic Tool
The most troublesome defect of CSAAS is that it is not a
tool to discover whether a child has been sexually abused.231 In
fact, “[n]owhere in Summit’s 1983 article does he ever claim
that it should be used for this purpose.”232 Instead, Summit has
continuously stated that “such utilization is inappropriate and
228 See generally GARDNER, supra note 1, at 297.
229 Robert C. Morgan & Ashe P. Puri, Expert Witnesses and Daubert Motions,
5 SEDONA CONF. J. 15, 20 (2004) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26). The relevant part of Rule 26
of the Federal Rules of Evidence reads, “In addition to the disclosures required by Rule
26(a)(1), a party must disclose to the other parties the identity of any witness it may
use at trial to present evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 703, or 705.” FED.
R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(A).
230 Morgan & Puri, supra note 229, at 20. The majority of states have adopted
Dalbert, and consequently a Daubert motion should be made. As of 2013, only a
handful of states have not adopted Daubert. In those states, a Frye motion should be
made. See generally Kat S. Hatziavramidis, Florida State Courts Adopt Daubert
Standard, Changing the Way Expert Testimony Operates, FORENSISGROUP (July 7,
2014), http://www.forensisgroup.com/our-blog/florida-state-courts-adopt-daubert-standard-
changing-the-way-expert-testimony-operates.
231 Myers, supra note 18, at 309 (quoting Mary B. Meinig, Profile of Roland
Summit, 1 VIOLENCE UPDATE 6, 6 (1991)); see Hall v. State, 611 So. 2d 915, 919 (Miss.
1992) (“[CSAAS] was not meant to be used as a diagnostic device to show that abuse
had, in fact, occurred.”).
232 GARDNER, supra note 1, at 298; see generally Summit, supra note 2, at 177.
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goes beyond the intentions of his description”233 and sought to
clarify CSAAS’s purpose in his 1992 clarification article.234
Thus, if an opponent seeks to introduce CSAAS evidence as
substantive evidence of abuse, the accused’s attorney must
object to this inappropriate use of Summit’s work.235 The
attorney’s objection to this misappropriation should be as
follows: “Your honor, CSAAS evidence should not be admitted
in this trial. Mrs. Smith’s attorney is seeking to admit CSAAS
evidence as proof that Jane was sexually abused. This, however,
is an incorrect use of CSAAS evidence. The scientific community
does not consider CSAAS as a tool to determine whether a child
has been sexually abused or not. All CSAAS does is explain how
children who have been abused respond to their abuse. CSAAS,
does not, however, tell us whether a child, like Jane, has been
abused. In fact, following Dr. Summit’s 1983 article identifying
CSAAS, prosecutors and defense attorneys used CSAAS evidence
in exactly this way, and Dr. Summit wrote a follow-up article
criticizing this improper use of his article. Furthermore, as the
New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. J.Q. explained, the
majority of courts across the nation do not admit CSAAS
evidence ‘as substantive evidence of abuse.’”236
B. CSAAS is Obsolete
The second weakness of CSAAS testimony is that it is
inapplicable to our modern world.237 CSAAS is relatively
outdated, having been established in 1983.238 Relying on the
stories of sexual abuse victims of the early 1980s, CSAAS
explains that children may delay disclosure of their abuse or
recant their stories because of fear of not being believed by
adults, specifically their mothers and the police.239 Today,
however, sexual abuse allegations are progressively more
common.240 In fact, unlike in 1983, modern “mothers are much
more likely to believe the child[,] and the police and child
protective services . . . are likely to [err on the side of caution
and] accept as valid even the most frivolous and absurd
233 GARDNER, supra note 1, at 298.
234 Summit supra note 90; Weiss & Alexander, supra note 21, at 414.
235 Hall, 611 So. 2d at 919; seeMyers, supra note 18, at 318.
236 State v. J.Q., 617 A.2d 1196, 1201 (N.J. 1993) (quoting Myers et al., supra
note 142, at 68 (internal citations omitted).
237 See generally GARDNER, supra note 1 at 297-98.
238 Id. at 298.
239 Summit, supra note 2, at 187-89.
240 Paquette, supra note 7 (internal citation omitted).
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accusations.”241 With this change in society, it is no longer
appropriate to use CSAAS evidence to explain delays in
exposure or recantations. Consequently, when the accusing
parent’s attorney seeks to introduce CSAAS evidence to
rehabilitate the child, the accused parent’s attorney must
object to the obsolete nature of CSAAS evidence. The attorney
may object by arguing: “Your honor, CSAAS is incredibly
obsolete and inapplicable to our case. CSAAS was developed in
1983, a time when sexual abuse allegations were less common
and children who accused their parents of sexually abusing
them were not believed, especially by their mothers. It was
under these circumstances that Dr. Summit created CSAAS. Dr.
Summit explained that children often delay disclosure of their
abuse or recant for fear that they would not be believed. This is
no longer the case. Children are taught now from an early age
that if an adult touches them inappropriately they should tell
an adult immediately. Children are no longer under the
pressure Dr. Summit described. In fact, Dr. Summit specifically
said many girls recant their stories because mothers do not
believe them, but here, not only does Mrs. Smith believe the
accusation, she was the one who brought the accusation to the
court’s attention. As a result, evidence that Jane recanted is not
evidence that she was abused and felt pressure from her mother
to recant, but rather it is evidence that she is less credible
because she has changed her story.”
C. CSAAS Creates a “No-win Situation” for the Accused
The third problem with CSAAS evidence is that it
creates a “no-win situation” for the accused.242 According to
CSAAS, a common characteristic of children who have been
sexually abused is that they often recant their allegations and
deny abuse ever occurred.243 This characteristic of CSAAS
creates a “lose-lose battle” for the accused.244 “If the child
admits sexual abuse, then the allegation is considered
confirmed. If the child denies sexual abuse, then the allegation
is still considered confirmed by concluding that the denial is
241 GARDNER, supra note 1, at 297; see Mark Steller & Tascha Boychuk,
Children as Witnesses in Sexual Abuse Cases: Investigative Interview and Assessment
Techniques, in CHILDREN AS WITNESSES 47, 47 (Helen Dent & Rhona Flin eds. 1992)
(“[C]hild sexual abuse allegations . . . historically were dismissed as untrue.”).
242 GARDNER, supra note 1, at 298.
243 Summit, supra note 2, at 188.
244 GARDNER, supra note 1, at 298.
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merely a manifestation of the child being in the secrecy phase
of the CSAAS.”245 For an attorney defending the accused, this is
really the main reason to fight the admission of CSAAS
evidence against their client. The attorney should make
vehement objections such as: “Your honor, if this evidence
comes in against Mr. Smith, we will not need to have the rest of
the trial because your mind will already be made up. If evidence
is presented that Jane said on multiple occasions that her father
abused her, then Jane will be presented as an abuse victim. But
if evidence is presented that Jane told her mother that her
father abused her, but then told the social worker her father did
not abuse her, then under CSAAS Jane is again presented as an
abuse victim. Either way, Jane is automatically presented as an
abuse victim. Mr. Smith should be able to expose the
inconsistencies in Jane’s disclosure to her mother and the
interviews with the social worker, but CSAAS will take away
any benefit from that cross-examination.”
D. CSAAS Rejects Other Causes of Helplessness and
Accommodation Emotions
The fourth weakness with CSAAS lies with the
“helplessness” and “accommodation” elements. According to
CSAAS, child victims often have feelings of helplessness and
rage. Summit explains that many of these children express
these emotions through “self-hate, self-mutilation, suicidal
behavior, promiscuous sexual activity and repeated
runaways . . . .”246 CSAAS does not, however, consider other
explanations for the child’s rage or sense of helplessness.247 In
fact, there are many reasons a child may be angry; reasons
“that have absolutely nothing to do with sex abuse,”248 but
everything to do with something else, such as their parents’
custody dispute.249 A defense attorney must point out the
inadequacy of these elements to the court. An attorney may
argue, “Your honor, CSAAS explains that if a child feels
helpless or full of rage and acts out, she is more than likely
expressing her rage after years of abuse. CSAAS, however, does
245 Id. (emphasis in original).
246 Summit, supra note 2, at 185.
247 GARDNER, supra note 1, at 298-99.
248 Id. at 299.
249 Paquette, supra note 7, at 1424 (internal citation omitted) (“Emotions
displayed by a child involved in a bitter custody dispute are similar to those emotions
displayed by a sexually abused child.”).
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not consider any other reason the child may be helpless or
angry. Perhaps she is feeling these emotions over this current
custody dispute? For example, Jane may feel helpless because
she is being treated “like a rope in a tug-of-war” between her two
parents. Maybe she has been throwing temper tantrums to get
her parents’ attention, not because she has been abused by Mr.
Smith. Maybe she threw her book at her teacher last week
because she is angry her parents are getting a divorce, not
because she has been abused. Who knows? But what we do know
is that there are many reasons Jane may be acting out, not just
because she may have been abused.”
E. CSAAS is Extremely Prejudicial
Finally, the fifth weakness of CSAAS testimony is that
it has little probative value and is highly prejudicial to the
accused.250 Under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
and its state counterparts, evidence may be inadmissible “if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one
or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly
presenting cumulative evidence.”251 CSAAS “is not probative of
abuse;”252 it does not make the fact that the child was abused
“more probable or less probable than it would have been
without the evidence.” 253 Consequently, CSAAS testimony does
not assist the fact-finder, and thus, is barely probative.254
CSAAS testimony is, furthermore, highly prejudicial to the
accused because of its misleading qualities.255 For example, the
symptoms of CSAAS are present in other syndromes256 and may
appear in children who have not been abused.257 Additionally,
children who have been abused sometimes do not show any of
these characteristics.258 Furthermore the “overwhelmingly
250 Gitlin, supra note 91, at 506.
251 FED. R. EVID. 403.
252 State v. J.Q., 617 A.2d 1196, 1209 (N.J. 1993) (citing Myers et al., supra
note 30, at 67).
253 Newkirk v. Commonwealth, 937 S.W.2d 690, 693 (Ky. 1996) (citing KY R.
EVID. 401).
254 Id.
255 Gitlin, supra note 91, at 506.
256 J.Q., 617 A.2d at 1203.
257 Gitlin, supra note 91, at 506 (citing People v. Patino, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 345,
349 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)) (“The concern of unfair prejudice to the defendant is
particularly acute in child sexual abuse cases, because CSAAS evidence ‘can be highly
prejudicial if not properly handled by the trial court . . . [since] the particular aspects of
CSAAS are as consistent with false testimony as with true testimony.’”).
258 O’Donohue, supra note 8, at 298.
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persuasive nature of such testimony effectively dominat[es] the
decision-making process” taking the power away from the fact-
finder.259 Therefore, “admitting CSAAS evidence during trial has
resulted in nothing short of ‘widespread misunderstanding.’”260
As a result, attorneys for the accused must object to CSAAS
testimony on relevance grounds. They may consider saying:
“Your honor, CSAAS is not relevant under a 403 balancing test.
First, CSAAS has little probative value as it does not detect
abuse. In fact, the Supreme Court of Kentucky has described it
as ‘generic and unreliable.’261 It only describes common
characteristics of abuse victims. For example, if Mrs. Smith
proves that Jane has the characteristics of CSAAS, she has not
proven anything, most especially not that Jane has been abused.
Furthermore, these characteristics appear in children who have
not been abused and are characteristics of many other
syndromes. Thus, CSAAS evidence is just meant to mislead you
and further prejudice Mr. Smith.”
V. CROSS EXAMINING EXPERTWITNESSES
Regardless of the above objections, in the majority
states CSAAS evidence will most likely be admissible at the
trial to explain why the child may have delayed in disclosing
her abuse or why she may have recanted her story.262 This is
particularly the case in family court where the rules of
evidence are relaxed.263 In criminal cases involving accusations
of child sexual abuse, such as those surveyed supra, the judges
will take their gate-keeper role seriously before admitting
CSAAS testimony since the stakes are so high—mandatory
sentences and sexual offender registration;264 in family court,
however, judges are more likely to admit expert evidence on
259 Sanderson v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W.3d 610, 613 (Ky. 2009) (internal
citation and quotations omitted).
260 Gitlin, supra note 91, at 506 (citing Myers et al., supra note 30, at 68).
261 Sanderson, 291 S.W.3d at 614.
262 People v. Spicola, 947 N.E.2d 620, 635 (N.Y. 2011); State v. J.Q., 617 A.2d
1196, 1209 (N.J. 1993).
263 See Hardin, supra note 227, at 179; see generally Newman, supra note 227
(generally explaining some of the unique rules in juvenile court including the
admittance of testimony of “prior bad acts” to show propensity and hearsay evidence);
e.g., Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.44.120 (West 2013).
264 See STATE STATUTES RELATED TO JESSICA’S LAW, NATIONAL CONFERENCE
FOR STATE LEGISLATURES, available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/WorkGroups/
sexoffenders/NCSLs_Jessicas_Law_Summary.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2015); e.g.,
CONSEQUENCES FOR SEX OFFENSES AGAINST A CHILD IN VERMONT, available at
http://www.leg.state.vt.us/WorkGroups/sexoffenders/Sex_offense_penalty_chart.pdf
(last visited Jan. 30, 2015).
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CSAAS in order to gain as much evidence as possible to make
their custody and visitation determinations.265 That is not to say
that the stakes are not high in family court; a parent accused of
sexually abusing his or her child could lose custody of the child,
could be required to have only supervised visitation with the
child, or could lose visitation all together.266 Because this evidence
is likely to come in, with a limitation as to its purpose, attorneys
for the accused need to expect to lose their motion to exclude the
expert testimony. As a result, they should be prepared to
highlight the weaknesses of CSAAS testimony in their
examination of the expert witness and be prepared to expand on
these weaknesses in their opening and closing arguments.
A. “Battle of the Experts”
Once the motion to exclude the expert testimony on
CSAAS is denied, the attorney of the accused parent must then
seek to present an expert as well, creating a “battle of the
experts.” Although the testimony, if admissible, will most likely
only be used to rehabilitate the child, its inclusion is inherently
accusatory. When the witness testifies to the common
characteristics of an abused child, he or she is, in a way, saying
that the child was probably abused if she has that
characteristic.267 For example, an expert witness may say, “It is
very common for a child who has been sexually abused to recant
her allegations.”268 Because Jane has recanted, the judge may
infer that she has been abused, despite the fact that the expert
did not specifically say so.
In order to combat this type of testimony, the accused
will also need an expert.269 A good expert is one who believes in
the accused parent’s case, has had substantial training, is a
member of “professional societies,” has experience lecturing,
265 See generally United States v. Frabizio, 445 F. Supp. 2d 152, n.7 (D. Mass.
2006) (“Although the rules of evidence apply equally in civil and criminal cases, the
Court must be especially vigilant in applying evidentiary rules in the criminal context,
given the stakes for the defendant and the fact that, ultimately, the government bears
the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”); see also Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S.
880, 916 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen a person’s life is at stake . . . a
requirement of greater reliability should prevail.”).
266 See generally Paquette, supra note 7, at 1420.
267 Newkirk v. Commonwealth, 937 S.W.2d 690, 693 (Ky. 1996).
268 Summit, supra note 3, at 190.
269 GOLDZBAND, supra note 7, at 42 (“[T]he lawyer would probably want to use
psychiatric evidence to support his position, and also to combat possible psychiatric
evidence introduced by the opposition.”).
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perhaps as a professor at a university, and is board certified.270
The lawyer can search for these qualities by interviewing
potential experts and reading each candidate’s curriculum
vitae.271 Additionally the expert must have certain experience in
the field of child sexual abuse in order to be qualified to testify:
The expert must possess specialized knowledge of child development,
individual and family dynamics, patterns of child sexual abuse, the
disclosure process, signs and symptoms of abuse, and the use and
limits of psychological tests. The expert is familiar with the
literature on child abuse, and understands the significance of
developmentally inappropriate sexual knowledge. The expert is able
to interpret medical reports and laboratory tests. The expert also is
trained in the art of interviewing children, and is aware of the
literature on coached and fabricated allegations of abuse. Of
tremendous importance is the expert’s clinical experience with
sexually abused children.272
In order to combat CSAAS testimony, the accused’s
expert will need to point out the weaknesses in the study. For
example, if the accusing parent’s witness testifies to the
common characteristics of CSAAS, the accused parent’s expert
witness must counter with other scientific evidence. For
example, it is important to point out that other studies show
that “there are no markers of abuse[; c]hildren who are
sexually abused experience a wide range of symptoms . . . [and]
there is no unique pattern of symptoms exhibited by the
sexually abused child.”273 As a result, it will be important for
the accused’s expert witness’s responses on direct examination
to explain this by saying, “There is no clear indicator of child
sexual abuse, and there is no set of characteristics exhibited by
all abused children. Some abused children show none of the
symptoms, and some children who have not been abused show
them all.”274 Additionally, it will be important to really drive
home that CSAAS does not necessarily mean the child was
abused. Consequently, the attorney for the accused should be
sure to question the expert in such a way that he or she explains
to the judge by testifying, “The theory that a child has been
abused because she has or does not have a characteristic of
CSAAS is an improper use of CSAAS because CSAAS was never
270 GOLDZBAND, supra note 7, at 55-59.
271 Id.
272 State v. J.Q., 617 A.2d 1196, 1202 (N.J. 1993) (quoting E.B. MYERS,
EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE ANDNEGLECT CASES 284-85 (2d ed. 1992)).
273 O’Donohue, supra note 8, at 298 (internal citations omitted); see State v.
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 401 (Utah 1989) (internal citations omitted).
274 O’Donohue, supra note 8, at 298 (internal citations omitted).
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meant to detect child abuse. Also, there are many other reasons
that a child may be experiencing these characteristics, most of
which probably stem from this custody dispute.”
B. Cross-Examination of the Accusing Parent’s Expert
Witness
Although the two experts should, in a way, cancel out
each other, the attorney for the accused parent must still cross-
examine the accusing parent’s expert witness by focusing on
the weaknesses of CSAAS. The attorney must also remember
to focus on the fact that CSAAS is a non-diagnostic tool that is
not probative of abuse.275
The first step the defense attorney should take is to
point out that this expert has no knowledge of whether the
child was sexually abused by the accused parent since CSAAS
is a nondiagnostic tool. Experts on CSAAS will be permitted to
testify on common characteristics of sexually abused children,
but not on individual victims.276 On this cross-examination, the
accused’s attorney must remind the trier of fact that this
witness is not testifying about the child, but only general
information. A defense attorney could ask the following
questions: “You testified on direct examination that you never
interviewed Jane, correct? Rather, all you testified to is common
characteristics of abused children, correct? And since CSAAS is
not a diagnostic tool, you cannot definitively say whether or not
Jane was sexually abused by Mr. Smith, correct? In fact, it
would be an improper use of Dr. Summit’s research to state
definitively whether a child was abused, isn’t that correct?”
The next step the attorney for the accused parent
should take is to point out how CSAAS is obsolete. Since sexual
abuse allegations are no longer immediately dismissed, the
pressures Summit describes that cause children to recant are
no longer relevant.277 As a result, it is important to point out
that Jane recanted not because she felt pressure from society
or from her mother. The attorney for the accused should
consider asking the following questions of the expert: “You
testified on direct examination that after a child discloses his or
her abuse, the child may recant because their biggest fears have
come to life, correct? They feel that they have ruined their
275 State v. Davis, 581 N.E.2d 604, 609 (Ohio 1989).
276 SeeW.R.C. v. State, 69 So. 3d 933, 939 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010).
277 GARDNER, supra note 1, at 297.
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families, correct? You testified that their mothers guilt them into
recanting in order to save the family, correct? When Dr. Summit
wrote his article, mothers and fathers were blaming their victim
children for the hardships facing their families, correct? But
this is no longer the case anymore, is it? Today, children are
taught to immediately tell a teacher, parent, or coach if an adult
touches them in any way. Isn’t that correct? Aren’t children
programmed now to understand that if they report abuse that
their parents will stand by to support them, to protect them?
Aren’t children told to report abuse to the police, no matter who
the abuser is? Isn’t it true the environment that Dr. Summit
wrote his article in has disappeared?”
Next, the attorney for the accused parent must clarify
that the child’s initial accusation was not “delayed” (Jane
accused her father of abusing her for four weeks, but did not
disclose until after the fourth week) to accommodate the abuse
but rather was a false allegation. Summit believed that
children delay their disclosure and do not seek help because
they love their abusive parent and do not want to get their
parent in trouble.278 It is the job of the accused parent’s
attorney to point out that this is not necessarily true; that if
abuse had truly happened, the child would have disclosed
sooner. The attorney should lead the expert into saying there
are other reasons the child may have accused her parent of
sexual abuse after the fact because the allegation is fabricated.
This is incredibly important because it is very possible that
Jane is lying because Mrs. Smith has suggested or told her to
lie, with hopes of keeping Mr. Smith from his daughter.279 It is
also possible that Jane wants to live with her mother, either on
her own accord or because of her mother’s suggestions, and as a
result, is making up a story about her father.280 Without
intending to, parents can easily make suggestions to their
children causing the children to make up false stories and
accusations.281
To do this, the attorney should ask: “You testified on
direct examination that children may wait long periods of time
278 Summit, supra note 2, at 186.
279 O’Donohue, supra note 8; see Alexander, supra note 10.
280 Paquette, supra note 7, at 1421 (citing Blush & Ross, Sexual Abuse
Allegations in Divorce: The SAID Syndrome, in SEXUAL ABUSE ALLEGATIONS IN
DIVORCE CASES 67, 82 (1988)) (footnote citation and quotation omitted).
281 O’Donohue, supra note 8, at 302 (citing Poole, D.A., & Lindsay, D.S.,
Interviewing Preschoolers: Effects of Nonsuggestive Techniques, Parental Coaching, and
Leading Questions on Reports of Nonexperienced Events, 60 EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1,
129-54 (1995)).
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to disclose their abuse because they fear their allegations will be
dismissed outright as lies, correct? And that these children
would rather accommodate the abuse than face adults or the
police who may not believe their allegations, correct? But as we
just discussed, children today are taught to come to an adult
immediately if another adult touches them, correct? Under that
reasoning, we would expect Jane to tell someone that her father
had abused her, wouldn’t we? But Jane did not tell anyone her
father had abused her, did she? She didn’t tell her mother? She
didn’t tell her teacher? Her dance instructor? Her soccer coach?
She didn’t tell anyone she was being abused, did she? So isn’t it
possible that she did not delay disclosing her abuse because it
just never happened? Couldn’t it instead be possible that she
made the allegations when she did because of other reasons?
Isn’t it possible that Mrs. Smith told Jane to make up this
story? Isn’t it possible that Mrs. Smith suggested to Jane that
her father had harmed her? Isn’t it possible that Jane just
wants to be sure that she does not live with her father? And
since CSAAS is not a diagnostic tool, you cannot be certain that
there was a delayed disclosure rather than a fabricated
allegation, can you?”
Finally the last step the accused parent’s attorney
should take is to point out the issues with the “helplessness”
and the “accommodation” elements. According to CSAAS, child
victims often have feelings of helplessness and rage.282 Because
CSAAS does not consider other explanations for the child’s rage
or sense of helplessness,283 the attorney for the accused parent
must point out the other potential causes of the emotions,
namely the custody dispute.284 The attorney may consider
asking the expert the following questions: “You testified on
direct examination that a child may experience feelings of
helplessness and rage, correct? You said a child may harm
herself, correct? She may cry, correct? She may lash out at
school, correct? But there could be other reasons that a child
lashes out at school correct? In fact, isn’t it possible that a child
whose parents are getting divorced may begin to act out in
school? The child may be upset that one parent has left the
marital house, correct? The child may be upset that she does not
282 Summit, supra note 3, at 186.
283 GARDNER, supra note 1, at 298-99.
284 Paquette, supra note 8, at 1424 (citing Daniel C. Schman, False Allegations
of Physical and Sexual Abuse, 14 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 5, 16 (1986))
(“Emotions displayed by a child involved in a bitter custody dispute are similar to those
emotions displayed by a sexually abused child.”).
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see the nonresidential parent that often, correct? The child may
feel she is to blame for the breakup, correct? She may feel that
she is a pawn in the parties’ custody case, correct? She may feel
that the visitation schedule is overwhelming, correct? In fact
there are many reasons the child may act out in school, correct?
And since CSAAS is not a diagnostic tool, you can’t be sure that
a child acting out in school has been sexually abused, can you?”
Thus, with each set of questions, the elements of CSAAS are
combatted. When the accused parent’s attorney uses these
questions to point out the inconsistencies between what CSAAS
stands for and the facts of reality, the judge will not
automatically assume the child has been abused and will
instead rely on the facts of the trial.
CONCLUSION
CSAAS evidence may present huge obstacles for an
attorney representing a client accused of sexually abusing his
child during a custody dispute. The most challenging element
is that CSAAS creates a “lose-lose” situation for the accused
father.285 It may seem that if CSAAS testimony is admitted into
evidence, the accused father will automatically be found to
have abused his daughter and he will lose all visitation rights.
The attorney, however, can rely on the weaknesses of
CSAAS in order to still advocate for his client. First, the
attorney should move to exclude any expert testimony on
CSAAS. When arguing on the motion to exclude, attorneys for
the accused parent should use CSAAS shortcomings to object to
the admittance of expert testimony. If the judge admits expert
testimony nonetheless, the attorney should cross-examine the
expert witness pointing out all the vulnerabilities of CSAAS
testimony. With these two steps, the attorney for the accused
parent can not only vindicate his client, but also ensure that
his client still has the opportunity to raise his daughter and
watch her grow.
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